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The neo-classical model of infant industry protection has influenced both policy prescriptions
in much of this century, and their empirical evaluations. This paper addresses a fundamental
limitation of the neo-classical model, that agents have static expectations. Allowing agents to
respond to future expectations alone reveals a previously unexplored relationship between
protection and the industry's time path, and provides new policy implications. If an industry is
to be protected until its good is competitive in the world market (as suggested in textbooks),
its success is as likely as its failure. This explains the unreliability of protection programs in
practice, and the mixed nature of empirical evaluations of their effectiveness. The industry's
decline after an initial take-off can also be explained as an equilibrium. For the industry's
growth to be an equilibrium, protection can be removed before the industry achieves
international competitiveness. For the industry's growth to be the unique equilibrium,
protection has to continue even after international competitiveness is achieved. This paper
presents an analysis of how policy affects the global perfect foresight dynamics in the
presence of non-linearities.
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1. Introduction
"The infant industry argument is the oldest and best known rationale for
intervention,"
1 of an industry or of the manufacturing sector as a whole. Motivated at least
to some extent by the argument, the U. S., Japan, and Germany all began their
industrialization processes under protection, and many developing countries attempted
import substituting industrialization policies in the decades following World War II.
The current state of knowledge can be summarized as follows. The "neo-classical"
trade theory shows that temporary protection of an industry can be justified under the
existence of market failures when the Mill-Bastable criteria are satisfied.
2 External
economies of scale such as knowledge spillovers, trained-worker spillovers, and inter-
industry complementarities are usually pointed out as sources of market failure,
3 and
models indicate that protection should be removed once the product is competitive at world
market prices. Although most economists agree on the theoretical validity of the argument,
the apparent dismal performances of post-World War II interventionist policies have lead to
a general skepticism over the practical significance of the infant industry argument, and to a
widespread acceptance of market oriented policy stances.
4
                                                
1 Krueger (1984, p. 522)
2 Corden (1974, Chapter 9; 1997, Chapter 8) provides a comprehensive synopsis of the infant industry
argument. The Mill criterion requires productivity to increase over time such that the industry can
eventually be able to compete under free trade. The Bastable criterion requires the intertemporal social
benefit of protection to be greater than the social cost.
3 Helpman (1984, p. 329) states, "Explanations of external economies — economies of scale which are
external to the firm but internal to the industry — rest on the argument that a larger industry takes better
advantage of within-industry specialization (the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market, and
so is probably the division of other factors of production), as well as better advantage of conglomeration,
indivisibilities, and public intermediate inputs such as roads... ." A formulation alternative to external
economies is internal economies with capital market imperfection.
4 Some of the problems of infant industry argument that have been pointed out are: difficulty to identify
infant industries, capturing of policy by special interests, lack of competitive pressure keeping firms from
becoming efficient, failure of realization of economies of scale due to the small domestic market size, and
time inconsistency of policy (Tornell 1991). One objective of our paper is to point out that even without
these problems, protection policies can fail.2
The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive in evaluating the effectiveness of
infant industry protection policies.
5 Krueger and Tuncer (1982, p. 1148) report the absence
of a "systematic tendency for more-protected firms or industries to have had higher growth
of output per unit of input than less-protected firms and industries" in Turkish data of the
1960's and 70's, but Harrison (1994), on the other hand, finds that the tendency does exist
in the same data. Bell, Ross-Larson, and Westphal (1984) report the mixed nature of
evidence. Nishimizu and Page (1991) find positive correlation between export growth and
TFP growth, but at the same time find negative correlation between import penetration and
TFP growth. The literature is still not at ease in evaluating the validity and effectiveness of
infant industry protection policies. We attempt to resolve this puzzle by addressing a
fundamental shortcoming of the neo-classical infant industry model on which policy
prescriptions and empirical evaluations, at least to some extent, have been based: that agents
base their behavior on just the current state of the economy.
We consider a typical model of an infant industry, comprising of perfectly competitive
producers (firms) with dynamic external economies of scale which are external to each
producer and internal to the industry and country. One limitation of the neo-classical models is
that despite the dynamic question, agents have static expectations, responding to just the
current costs and prices.
6 We depart from the literature by allowing agents to make
"investment" decisions responding to expectations of the future. In particular, we assume that
agents have perfect foresight over the future paths of the scale of industry and the rate of
production subsidy. This brings forward the possibility of multiple self-fulfilling expectations
equilibria corresponding to a given subsidy scheme.
7 If the industry is not expected to grow,
                                                
5 Rodrik (1995, pp. 2933-41) provides a survey of the empirical literature.
6 For example, in both Ethier (1982) and Panagariya (1986), factor reallocation depends on the difference in
current returns between two sectors. As with their models and the tradition in the neo-classical international
trade literature, we model the external economies to be Marshallian that depend on the scale of the sector. In
light of reality, this and the perfect foresight assumptions may be considered as restrictive, but are adopted
to produce a benchmark model the results of which can be contrasted with those of other models.
7 This should be distinguished from models with just internal economies for which the producer does make
investment decisions but there is no room for multiple self-fulfilling equilibria since the producer
internalizes the economies of scale.3
then individual producers do not expect a future increase in productivity (from external
economies), and it is possible for each of the producers to find investment not worthwhile even
with an initial period of protection. If this is the case, no producer invests, and the expectation
that the industry will not grow is fulfilled. On the other hand, under the same protection, if
growth of the industry and realization of economies of scale is expected, investment can
become worthwhile for individual producers. If this is the case, producers invest and the
expectation of the industry's growth is fulfilled. Thus it is possible for the same protection
policy to succeed as well as to fail depending on expectations. This is consistent with the
unreliability of protectionist programs in practice, warranting the skepticism. This is also
consistent with the mixed nature of empirical evidence. In fact, none of the empirical studies
seems to take into account this possibility of multiple self-fulfilling expectations equilibria.
In this paper, we go beyond pointing out the possibility of multiplicity of equilibria.
We characterize each of the equilibrium paths, and examine how the equilibrium set changes
with protection of different durations and effective rates. This yields remarkably different
policy implications compared to those in the literature. The neo-classical policy prescription
("textbook policy") is that protection should be applied to effectively set the domestic price
(marginally) above the average cost until the industry is competitive in the world market.
8 If
this protection is applied in our model, we find that there are multiple self-fulfilling
equilibrium paths the industry can follow: the industry can remain in stagnation, it can take-
off and grow, it can take-off but U-turn and shrink, or it can go into various cycles.
9,10 The
eventual success of the industry is as likely as its eventual failure under this policy.
                                                
8 By becoming competitive in the world market, we mean that the average cost falls to the level of the current
world price of the good. Most textbooks of international trade and economic development indicate this to be the
timing of policy removal, with the presumption that agents have static expectations. For example, Krugman and
Obstfeld (1997, pp. 150-155) base their discussion on the comparison of average cost and current world price.
9 Consistent to this result is the finding by Bell, Ross-Larson, and Westphal (1984, p. 123): "... evidence does
suggest that many infant firms have failed to reach international competitiveness — or if they have once reached
it, have failed to maintain it." They point out cases of firms failing to reach competitiveness, firms reaching
competitiveness but failing to maintain it, and firms reaching competitiveness and successfully maintaining it.
10 Note that in our model, an equilibrium is the time path of the industry's scale.4
In our model, to have growth of the industry as an equilibrium, protection can end
before the industry is competitive in the world market. This is because given expectations
that the industry will grow, even producers who are price-takers and who cannot internalize
the external economies will be willing to endure current losses in exchange for expected
future returns. However, growth may not be the unique equilibrium since "pessimistic"
expectations can also be self-fulfilling. In order to have growth as the unique equilibrium,
the most pessimistic of expectations must not be self-fulfilling, and for that, the minimal rate
of protection has to be sufficiently higher than that implied by the neo-classical model, and
protection has to continue even after the industry becomes competitive in the world market.
Furthermore, our model points out that even with perfect foresight expectations,
policymakers must distinguish the duration and the rate of protection. We establish the result that
protection policy of a shorter duration and a higher rate cannot always substitute that of a longer
duration and lower rate. This is true even with perfect foresight expectations. This distinction of
rate and duration, as well as the link between protection policies and multiplicity of equilibrium
paths have not been addressed in a formal dynamic model before, perhaps due to the complexity
of solving global perfect foresight dynamics in the presence of nonlinearities. By incorporating a
fundamental behavioral assumption that agents base their behavior on expectations, we are able to
expose the rich relationship between policy and outcome, the knowledge of which is vital given
the importance of the question in the literature and in practice. The qualitative difference in policy
implication makes the neo-classical model's results questionable even as a benchmark.
Details of the Model and Intuitions
Our model is that of a small open economy with two perfectly competitive sectors,
agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M). The infant manufacturing sector is subject to Marshallian
external economies: the (current) return in this sector depends positively on its size. Sector A has
constant returns to scale. We assume that the Mill-Bastable criteria are satisfied to limit ourselves5
to positive analysis. For perfect foresight dynamics, we adapt the model of Matsuyama (1991).
11
Matsuyama's model is that of real time sectoral adjustment, with perfect foresight guiding the shift
of resources from one sector to another. Matsuyama identifies the roles of history and
expectations, and as an application considers policy. He shows how subsidies of constant rates
applied for an indefinite period can make the favorable equilibrium possible. Our analysis differs
in two respects. Firstly, we take a positive approach to the multiplicity of equilibria: our objective
is to determine the possible ways in which the economy can behave under each given subsidy
scheme. Secondly, we vary both the duration and the rate of subsidy. By varying the duration, we
are able to address the issue of the timing of removal of protection. We find that the outcome
depends critically on when protection is removed, and establish the aforementioned result that the
duration and the rate of protection are not substitutes. We are able to contrast the timing of
protection removal with that implied by the neo-classical model. Instead of subsidies of constant
rates, we analyze non-linear subsidies whose effects are linear, and by doing so we are able to
expose with simplicity the relationship between policy and outcome.kitttttttttttttttty
The economy consists of a population of agents, each endowed with one unit of the
single (composite) resource called labor. Initially, all the labor is in sector A, and the current
return on each unit of labor is less in sector M than in sector A under free trade. Due to
external economies, the sector M current return is (strictly) increasing in its scale, and
becomes greater than the sector A current return once past the threshold scale. At this
threshold scale the private opportunity cost of M undercuts the world relative price of M.
The neo-classical "textbook policy" is to raise the domestic relative price of M such that the
sector M current return is effectively equal to (or marginally above) the sector A current
return until this threshold scale is reached.
Over continuous time, agents in the population receive at random (by a Poisson
process) separation opportunities to change the sector to which their labor is supplied. To
                                                
11 Krugman (1991), Matsuyama (1992), and Kaneda (1995) also study global perfect foresight dynamics in
models of sectoral adjustment.6
model inertia, the sectoral choice by each agent is assumed to be irreversible until the arrival
of her next separation opportunity. Therefore, it is all but natural for each agent to base the
decision on future expectations. A separated agent thus chooses to invest her labor in the
sector with higher asset value of labor. The asset value of investing in sector M depends on
both the expected future path of the scale of sector M and the future path of the subsidy rate.
Sectoral choices of separated agents change the allocation of labor between the two
sectors, and this over time maps out the time path of the scale of sector M. If the expectation
is that every future separated agent will invest in sector M such that the sector M current
return will increase over time to become greater than that in sector A, then the sector M asset
value becomes equal to and surpasses that of sector A even while the current return is still
less in sector M. Therefore, in terms of duration, the minimal protection is to subsidize
sector M until this point is reached: protection can be removed before the private
opportunity cost undercuts the world relative price. In terms of rate, the minimal subsidy
rate is that which sets the current returns equal during the period of protection since this
assures the sector M asset value to remain no less than that of sector A during this period.
However, under the same policy, all of the agents re-investing in sector A over time
(stagnation of sector M) is also a self-fulfilling equilibrium. This is because if the expectation
is that sector M remains at zero scale, its current return is less than that of sector A at all times
except during protection when they are set equal. This means that the sector M asset value is
less at all times, no agent invests in sector M, and the expectation gets self-fulfilled. By the
same token, stagnation is also a self-fulfilling equilibrium even if this subsidy is extended to
any finite duration. No matter how long the duration of subsidy (except infinity), if the
subsidy is that which sets the current returns equal, stagnation of sector M is always a
possible equilibrium. It follows that for stagnation to not be an equilibrium, it is necessary for
the subsidy rate to be higher than that which equates the current returns, or equivalently,
higher than that which equates the domestic relative price and private opportunity cost.7
The take-off-U-turn-and-decline path is not an equilibrium under free trade, but can be
an equilibrium if protection lasts long enough. This is because if a future U-turn and decline
of sector M is expected, take-off will not occur in the first place unless induced by sufficient
protection. Interestingly, the U-turn occurs after the sector M private opportunity cost has
undercut its world relative price. For the U-turn to be an equilibrium, the sector M asset value
must turn from greater than to equal to and to less than the sector A asset value. For the sector
M asset value to be greater just before the U-turn, and less just after the U-turn, the sector M
current return at the U-turn must be greater than the sector A current return.
To have take-off and growth as the unique equilibrium, no matter how high the
subsidy rate, protection cannot stop before the sector M private opportunity cost undercuts
its world price, because if the decline of sector M is expected from that point on, the sector
M current return is less than sector A from that point on, the sector M asset value is less, and
U-turn will be self-fulfilled. This also demonstrates that the rate of subsidy and the duration
of subsidy are not isomorphic in the model.
The following section presents the model under free trade. Section 3 introduces
policy and presents the relationship between the duration of protection and the equilibrium
set. Section 4 generalizes the analysis to policies of longer durations and higher rates.
Section 5 concludes, and is followed by an Appendix of proofs.
2. Model
We model a small open economy with two perfectly competitive sectors, agriculture
(A) and manufacturing (M), and one factor of production called labor.
12 The economy is
populated by a continuum of agents, with each agent endowed with one unit of labor. The
                                                
12 This is the simplest setup that allows the exposition of the logic of our results. The small open
economy assumption lets the time paths of the world relative price and the interest rate be exogenous. We
further assume the time paths to be constants.8
measure of the population of agents is normalized to one, and thus the economy's labor
supply equals one.
At each given instant t within continuous time, each agent supplies her one unit of
labor inelasticly to either one of the two sectors, and obtains the value of her unit labor’s
output as current return. The fraction of total labor supply used in sector M is represented
by n(t), and this will serve as our state variable since n also represents the scale of sector M.
The initial state is zero scale of sector M, i.e. n(0)=0, and our objective is to analyze the
equilibrium time path of nÎ[0,1] as labor shifts between sectors.
Sector A has a constant returns to scale technology: each unit of labor produces one
unit of good A. Sector M is subject to Marshallian external economies of scale. Each unit of
labor in sector M produces k(n) units of good M, where labor productivity k is a strictly
increasing continuous function of the total labor input n. The difference in the current
returns (sector M minus sector A) is:
n, p ( ) = pk n ( ) -1, (1)
where p is the domestic relative price of good M in terms of the numeraire good A. Under
free trade, p equals the world relative price, p
*. To set the stage for infant industry protection,
we let  (0,p
*)<0< (1,p
*).
13 The scale of sector M that equates the current returns is
determined by  (nst, p
*)=0, and we call nstÎ(0,1) the static threshold.
Intersectoral labor reallocation is modeled by the random arrival of separation
opportunities to agents in the population. At each instant, fraction   of the agents, randomly
chosen from the population receive the opportunity to change the sector to which their labor
                                                
13 The sign of  (n, p
*) also represents the relationship between the private opportunity cost and the world
relative price. When  >0, we have 1/k(n)<p
*: the private opportunity cost of M is less than the world
relative price of M. When  <0, the relationship is reversed.9
is supplied. Sectoral choice by an agent is irreversible until the next separation opportunity
arrives.
14
If expectations were static, intersectoral labor reallocation would be guided by the
difference in current returns,  . This corresponds to the adjustment processes seen in the
literature of infant industry protection. Labor shifts from sector M to A when  <0, and from
sector A to M when  ³0.
15 Since the initial state is n=0, sector M remains trapped there.
The minimal protection policy that enables the infant to grow is to subsidize production of
good M such that   (n,p) is set equal to 0 until n becomes as large as nst. Here, the timing
of removal of protection is when the private opportunity cost equals the world relative price.
However, since an agent's sectoral choice affects her future returns, this choice is an
investment decision which is to be based on the asset value of the sectoral choice instead of
the current return difference,  . An agent receiving a separation opportunity at time t decides
to supply her labor to sector M if the following net asset value is non-negative:
 16,17
V t,n × ( ), p × () ( )= e




where r is the world discount rate and agents are assumed to have perfect foresight over the
expected paths of n and p. If V<0, labor is supplied to sector A.
The change in the state ( ˙  n ) at each t is therefore:
                                                
14 The separation opportunity arrives by a Poisson process of rate   which is constant across agents and
across time. With a continuum of agents, fraction   of the population receive the separation opportunity at
any moment. The average interval of time between arrivals of two separation opportunities is  e




(=1/ ). An alternative formulation is seen in Krugman (1991). He assumes quadratic adjustment costs,
rendering adjustment to take place over time.
15 Inclusion of the equality is a tie-breaker rule.
16 Agents can smooth consumption in the world credit market at discount rate r. In equilibrium, r can be
considered as the sum of   and the rate of time preference. This is because, in addition to discounting by
time preference, future returns from a given sectoral choice need also be multiplied by the probability that
the agent has not received the next separation opportunity, e
- -t ( ). The integral is normalized by dividing
by the expected interval of time between two separation opportunities, 1/ .
17 What is relevant to the agent is only her future returns influenced by the current choice of a sector; the
future sectoral choices after future separations are not dependent on her current sectoral choice.10
˙  n t,n t ( ),p t ( ) ( ) = - n t ( ) if V t,n × ( ),p × ( ) ( ) < 0





with a slight abuse of notation in the arguments of the n(t) function. Path n × ( ) is a perfect
foresight equilibrium if it satisfies (3).
18
Taking the derivative of (2) with respect to t, we obtain
˙  V t,n t ( ), p t ( ) ( ) = rV t,n × (),p × () ( )- n t ( ),p t ( ) ( ). (4)
Given that p(·) is at the constant value of p
* under free trade, (3) and (4) describe the global
dynamics of the economy on the (n, V) plane, shown in Figure 1. We have a system of
unstable spirals around the static threshold nst. On this plane,  ˙  n =0 at points S0 and S1, ˙  n <0
only if V<0,  ˙  n >0 only if V³0. The  ˙  V =0 locus is V= r (n,p), which notably is a positive
scalar multiple of the   function. The value of V depends on the expected path of n, so there
is a possibility of a multiplicity of perfect foresight equilibrium paths from a given initial
value of n. Points S0 and S1 are the steady states of the system, which we call the low level
and the high level steady states respectively. Only the saddle paths and the steady states are
perfect foresight equilibrium paths since (2) is satisfied only on convergent paths.
Our model makes a fundamental change to the neo-classical model of infant
industry protection with Marshallian external economies. We allow agents to base their
decisions on future expectations, and the difference in dynamics is striking. The unstable
spirals around nst arise due to external economies (  increasing in n) and positive
discounting (r>0). Where a path changes directions, the net asset value must change signs
(V=0). It follows that between any two points of direction change, the discounted sum of
current return differences is zero. For example, in Figure 1, take the path for which n
                                                
18 Note that time consistency along an equilibrium path is assured by it being a perfect equilibrium.11
increases from na3 to nb2, and then decreases from nb2 to na1. As n increases from na3 to nb2,
 increases as observable on the  ˙  V =0 locus, and the discounted sum of   between na3 and
nb2 is zero. As n decreases from nb2, since   decreases, and the far future is discounted
more than the near future, n has to decrease past na3 for the discounted sum of   between
the turning points to be zero again.
Figure 1 illustrates the case in which the only free trade equilibrium starting from
the initial state of n=0 is to stay there: sector M is stagnant at the low-level steady state S0.
This we take to be the case relevant to analyze infant industry protection.
An observation of Figure 1 will reveal some of our results. If sector M is protected
until it grows as large as na1, the economy can then be on the saddle path towards S1. na1 is
smaller than nst. If protection continues until sector M is as large as na2, then the economy
can be on either of two saddle paths: that which goes to S1 and that which cycles and goes
to S0. Multiple equilibria are possible, and we provide a formal analysis in the next section.
3. Protection of Sector M
(a) Definitions
In Figure 1, there are two saddle paths originating from n=nst. Points (na1,na2,na3,
...) and (nb1,nb2,nb3, ...) are where these paths change directions. Appendix A shows how
their values are determined.
Equation (3) implies that along any path,  ˙  n  must be either - n or + (1-n). Consider
now the monotonic growth path of sector M, which is n(0)=0 and  ˙  n t ( ) = 1- n t ( ) ( ) for all t.
Explicitly, this path is n(t)=1-e
- t
, and using this, we can determine the times taken by this
growth path to reach (na1,na2,na3, ... , nst, ... , nb3, nb2, nb1). Let these be (ta1,ta2,ta3, ... , tst,
..., tb3, tb2, tb1) respectively. We have 0<ta1<ta2<ta3< ... <tst< ... <tb3<tb2<tb1.12






19 We now verify that path n
L, which is stagnation of sector M at zero scale, is an
equilibrium under free trade.
20 If n
L is expected, then V t,n
L × ( ), p
* ( )<0 for all t since
n
L t ( ),p
* ( )= 0, p
* ( )<0 for all t. Equation (3) then implies that  ˙  n =- n for all t, and such a
path from n(0)=0 is indeed n
L, fulfilling the expectations.
21
 (b) Production Subsidy
Our policy instrument is the production subsidy given to agents supplying labor to
sector M, financed by uniform lump sum taxation of all agents, with the government budget
balanced at each t. We peg the rate of subsidy to be that which makes the current returns in
the two sectors equal ( =0) at each t. The rate path of subsidy is thus non-linear, but the
resulting linearity of   during the period of protection allows us to obtain our results with
simplicity. The subsidy is applied during the time interval [0,T].
22
We can express a subsidy scheme by its effect on the current return difference:
n t ( ),p t ( ) ( ) =
= 0 for t Î 0,T [ ]
p





                                                
19 Note that n with subscripts refer to values in [0,1] while n with superscripts refer to time paths.
20 The following describes  the method we use to check if a path is an equilibrium. Equation (3) requires
any path of n to be increasing at rate  (1-n) or decreasing at rate  n. Given the expected paths of n and p,
(2) determines the path of V. For this expected path of n to be a self-fulfilling equilibrium, it has to be
increasing when V³0 and decreasing when V<0.
21 Figure 1 displays the case we consider in which n
L is the unique free trade equilibrium from n(0)=0. The
condition for this uniqueness is V 0, n
H × (),p
* ( )<0: even with the fastest growth expectations, n
H, V<0 at
time 0, and take-off is not possible under free trade.
22 Our analysis is general enough to allow other policy instruments. In this model, the production subsidy
creates no static distortion, since at each t, the value of n is fixed.13
T represents the duration of protection and   represents the value of   to which the effect
of subsidy is pegged.
23 In this section, we peg the effect of subsidy to  =0 and vary T
between 0 and tst to determine how the duration of protection affects outcome.
 (c) Duration of Protection versus the Equilibrium Set
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the duration of protection, [0,T], and (ta1,
ta2, ta3, ... , tst, ... , tb3, tb2, tb1). Table 2 is our primary result: the correspondence between the
duration of protection and the set of equilibrium paths, Its derivation is Appendix B. Below,
we describe how these paths become equilibria under protection of different durations, and
summarize the main findings as propositions. The proofs of the propositions are in
Appendix C.
(i) 0£T<ta1
If the duration of protection is shorter than ta1, then the only equilibrium is n
L. It can
be seen in Figure 1 that even if sector M had grown during this period, its scale will be
smaller than na1 and thus protection is insufficient to put the economy on the saddle path to
S1. To verify that there is no other equilibrium, consider first the path n
H, along which sector
M continuously grows. Note that na1 is defined as the point at which V=0 given growth
expectations. At time T, when protection is removed, the scale of sector M is smaller than na1
and thus the net asset value (V) is negative even with growth expectations during (T,¥).
Since protection makes the current return difference ( ) equal to zero during [0,T], V at time
0 is negative, and therefore n
H is not self-fulfilling. Furthermore, since   is strictly
increasing in n, V at time 0 for any other path is less than that for n
H and hence negative.
Therefore, n
L is the unique equilibrium.
                                                
23 The above restricts subsidy paths to those which are continuous in (0,T). Note that protection is
terminated indefinitely once T is reached, and that the rate path will depend on which equilibrium the
economy is in.14
(ii) ta1£T<ta2
If the duration of protection is longer than ta1, but shorter than ta2, then n
L and n
H are
the equilibria. Figure 3 shows the two equilibrium paths from n=0. Path n
L remains to be an
equilibrium, since if it is expected,  =0 during the period of protection and  <0 thereafter,
making V<0 for all t.
Figure 4 shows how n
H becomes an equilibrium under this policy. The top panel
displays path n
H. The thin curves in the bottom two panels plot the free trade time paths of 
and V corresponding to the expected path n
H. The value of V at each t is the current
discounted value of the future ([t,¥)) values of  , as verifiable on the figure. For n
H to be an
equilibrium, we need to have V³0 for all tÎ[0,¥). It can be seen on the figure that under free
trade, if n
H is expected, V<0 for tÎ[0,ta1), and V³0 for tÎ[ta1,¥). The production subsidy
makes  =0 during tÎ[0,ta1]Ì[0,T] (as shown by the bold line), letting V³0 in this period
(as shown by the bold curve) and thus V³0 for all tÎ[0,¥).
Proposition 1.1. To have n
H (monotonic growth of sector M) as an equilibrium, protection
can be removed at ta1 when the industry's size is na1. This duration of protection is shorter
than the implication of the static model, as ta1<tst and na1<nst.
Proposition 1.2.  At this point of protection removal, the private opportunity cost of good M
is higher than its world relative price.
Proposition 1.3. The values of ta1 and na1 depend positively on r (discount rate) and
negatively on   (rate of change).15
(iii) ta2£T<ta3
If the duration of protection is longer than ta2, then the orbital path, n
C1L
, for which
sector M takes off, grows to nb1, makes a U-turn there, and contracts back to n=0 becomes an




}, from n=0. Figure 6 shows
how n
C 1L
 becomes an equilibrium under this policy. Under free trade (thin curves), if n
C1L
 is
expected, then V<0 for tÎ( tb1,¥), V³0 for tÎ[ ta2, tb1], and V<0 for tÎ[0, ta2]. Since V<0 at
t=0, take-off does not take place, and n
C1L
 is not a free trade equilibrium. If a future
downturn is expected, then there will be no investments to that sector in the first place.
However, a sufficiently long protection will make the sector take off even with expectations
of a future downturn. In the figure, as shown by bold, protection sets  =0 during [0,T] and
this makes V³0 during [0, ta2]. Now we have V<0 for tÎ( tb1,¥), and V³0 for tÎ[ 0, tb1],
making n
C 1L
 an equilibrium. Intuitively, if a "bad" outcome is expected, then sector M will
not take off unless protected initially. Paths n
L and n
H are also equilibria by the same reasons
as those in (ii) above. The following holds if we confine policy to  =0 and TÎ[ 0, tst].
Proposition 2.1. Path n
C 1L
 is an equilibrium iff ta2£T£tst, where ta2> ta1.
Interpretation: The orbital path n
C1L
, in which sector M takes off but U-turns and contracts
towards the low level steady state, is an equilibrium if protection lasts longer than ta2, where
ta2>ta1. This equilibrium is not possible under free trade. Too long a protection, even if it
lasts shorter than tst, makes a growing Sector M to contract towards stagnation a possible
equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2.   nb1, p
* ( ) > 0.
Interpretation: At nb1, the U-turn point of path n
C1L
, the private opportunity cost of M is less
than its world relative price. Even with that, if the expectation is that sector M will decline,
then V<0 and the expectation will be fulfilled. It must be the case that  >0 at nb1, because
V>0 (V<0) just before (after) the U-turn at nb1 and V is the discounted sum of future  's.16
Proposition 2.3.  For tÎ(T, tb1):  ˙  n 
C1L t ( ) > 0.
Interpretation: Along path n
C1L
, after the removal of protection at time T, sector M continues
to grow until the U-turn point at time tb1. Even though an eventual U-turn is perfectly
foresighted and protection is no longer being applied, sector M continues to grow until the
U-turn point. Since V=0 and  >0 at the U-turn point, V>0 and  ˙  n >0 just before it.
(iv) ta3£T<ta4
If the duration of protection is longer than ta3, then the orbital path n
C1H
, for which
sector M takes off, grows to n=nb2, turns and contracts to n=na1, and then turns again and







Figure 7 shows how n
C1H
 becomes an equilibrium under this policy.
(v)  ta4£T<ta5










 is that in which the
economy cycles twice prior to heading to the low-level steady state. Sector M takes off,
grows to n=nb3, turns and contracts to n=na2, turns and grows to n=nb1, and then turns and
contracts to n=0.
(vi) T=tst
As the duration of protection is extended further to ([ta5, ta6), [ta6, ta7), [ta7, ta8), [ta8,








, ...) are consecutively included in the
equilibrium set, where Ci in the superscripts indicate the number of cycles made prior to
heading to the low or the high steady state indicated by L or H in the superscripts. At T= tst
the cardinality of the equilibrium set becomes countable infinity; the set consisting of n
L, n
H,
countably many cyclical paths leading to the low level steady state, and countably many
cyclical paths leading to the high level steady state. Note that under static expectations, this17
protection is the minimum that enables sector M to take-off and grow, and the equilibrium is
unique. If each equilibrium is as likely, then the likelihoods of the eventual success and the
eventual failure of sector M are the same.
Proposition 3.  If the minimal policy implied by the static model (setting  =0 until tst) is
applied to this model, then there is an infinite number of equilibria leading to either steady
state. The eventual success of the industry is as likely as its eventual failure.
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4. Policies of Longer Durations and Higher Pegged Rates
We next examine the possible equilibria under subsidizations of durations 0£T<¥,
and pegged effective rates  ³0. We express a subsidy scheme in terms of the path of  :
n t ( ),p t ( ) ( ) =
max , p
*k n t ( ) ( ) -1 { } for t Î 0,T [ ]
p





where TÎ[0,¥) and  Î[0,¥). We obtain the following propositions, the proofs of which
are in Appendix C.
Proposition 4.  If  =0, then for any TÎ[0,¥), n
L is an equilibrium.
Interpretation: If the effect of subsidy is pegged to that which makes the current returns in
the two sectors equal (or the private opportunity cost of M equal to its world relative price),
then stagnation of sector M is an equilibrium for any duration of protection.
                                                
24 In this paper, we place no restriction on expectation formation such that every perfect foresight
equilibrium is considered equally likely. It is hoped that this will serve as a benchmark for more restrictive
and realistic assumptions on expectation formation.18
Proposition 5.  If T<ta1, then for any  ³0, n
H is not an equilibrium.
Interpretation: If the duration is shorter than ta1, then no matter how high the pegged
effective rate of subsidy, growth of sector M cannot be an equilibrium. This implies that
changing the duration of protection is not isomorphic to changing the rate of protection.
Proposition 6.  If ta2£T<tb1, then for any  ³0, n
C 1L
 is an equilibrium.
Interpretation: If the duration is ta2£T<tb1, no matter how high the pegged effective rate of
subsidy, the orbital path n
C1L
 cannot be removed from the equilibrium set.
Proposition 7.  A necessary condition for n
H to be a unique equilibrium is T³tb1.
Interpretation: To make the growth path unique, protection cannot last shorter than tb1, for
any  ³0. For uniqueness, policy needs to continue even after the private opportunity cost
undercuts the world relative price at tst.
Proposition 8.  A sufficient condition for n
H to be the unique equilibrium is V tb1,n
L × (),p × () ( )³0.
Interpretation: If the subsidy lasts long enough beyond tb1 and the pegged rate is high
enough, such that at tb1 the value of V is non-negative even with the most pessimistic of
expectations n
L × (), then the only equilibrium is n
H. Such a policy is sufficient for
uniqueness of n
H. It is possible to make n
H unique, but both the associated duration and
pegged rate must be large compared to the neo-classical policy implication.
25
5. Concluding Remarks
Despite the theoretical rationale for infant industry protection, the effectiveness of
protection programs in practice has been observed to be questionable leading to a general
                                                
25 For practical purposes, such an extensive protection may be difficult and costly to administer.19
skepticism over infant industry protection policies and import-substituting industrialization.
We have addressed a fundamental aspect of the decision making process of agents, namely
expectations. By doing so, we were able to disclose the rich relationship between policy and
outcome, which was found to differ starkly from that of the neo-classical models and to be
more consistent with the practical experience and the mixed nature of the empirical
evaluations. To the extent  that economic agents base their behavior on the expected future,
the results of our model should have validity.
If expectations matter, then a policy prescription based on the static model results in
a multiplicity of equilibria where the industry's success is as likely as its failure. We have
shown that even without the "problems" inherent in the practice of protection policy (listed
in Footnote 4), and even if the government can commit to the future policy path, protection
may not work.
In this paper, we have focused on the positive issues by assuming that the Mill-
Bastable criteria are satisfied, by analyzing production subsidies which do not create static
distortion, and by abstracting from the administrative cost of policy. Having obtained the
positive results, it becomes possible to discuss some welfare implications. Suppose now that
there is a welfare cost to impose protection. Our model indicates that to have the industry's
success as one of the equilibria, protection can be removed before the industry is competitive
in the world market. For the industry's success to be the unique equilibrium, the rate of
protection has to be sufficiently high and protection needs to continue after the industry is
competitive in the world market. Therefore, if the sentiment of the private sector is of
optimism, or if the government can influence expectation formation through measures such as
propaganda, and if the cost of policy imposition is high, the former policy is more favorable.
On the other hand, if the cost of policy imposition is low and the government cannot hope
expectation to coordinate to the industry's success, the latter policy becomes more favorable.
The model indicates that graduation of industries from protection cannot be defined
by the comparison of the private opportunity cost and the world relative price. The static20
notion of the uniqueness of outcomes, and the "textbook policy" that protection should
continue until the industry achieves international competitiveness, may have misled actual
policy prescriptions and empirical evaluations of the infant industry argument. We await an
empirical evaluation of the significance of future expectations in this important problem.
APPENDIX
A. Obtaining (na1,na2,na3, ...) and (nb1,nb2,nb3, ...):
Below, we obtain the values of n at which the spirals change directions. We make use of V being
equal to 0 at these points given the expected future path. Under our assumptions,  º
r -1>0.
na1:  Consider the path n
a1 × ( ) that starts from na1 and increases monotonically to n=1 (i.e.
n
a1 0 ( ) = na1 and  ˙  n = 1- n ( ) for all n). This path is n
a1( ) =1- 1- na1 ( )e
- . Our na1 is defined
by V 0,n
a1 × (),p






ò  = 0. Substituting by  = n
a1( ), this becomes





nb1:  Consider the path n
b1 × ( ) that starts from nb1 and decreases monotonically to n=0 (i.e.
n
b1 0 ( ) = nb1 and  ˙  n = - n for all n). This path is n
b1( ) = nb1e
- . Our nb1 is defined by
V 0,n
b1 × (),p






ò  = 0. Substituting by  = n






nb2:  Consider the path n
b2 × ( ) that starts from nb2, ˙  n = - n until it reaches na1, and  ˙  n = 1- n ( )
after that. This path is nb2e
-  as n decreases from nb2 to na1, and n
a1 × ( ) after that. Our nb1 is
defined by V 0,n
b2 × (),p
* ( ) =0. Since the value of V at na1 when the path changes directions is 0,









ò =0, which after substitution by
= n
b2( ) = nb2e





na2: Consider the path n
a2 × ( ) that starts from na2, ˙  n = 1- n ( ) until it reaches nb1, and  ˙  n = - n
after that. This path is 1- 1- na2 ( )e
-  as n increases from na2 to nb1, and n
b1 × ( ) after that. Our
na2 is defined by V 0,n
a2 × (),p
* ( ) =0. Since the value of V at nb1 when the path changes









ò =0, which after substitution by
= n
a2( ) =1- 1-na2 ( )e





Recursively, the values of nai and nbi for i=3,4,5,... can be obtained.
B. Proof: Duration of Protection versus the Equilibrium Set
Policy as defined by equation (5) is applied to the economy. Note that  =0 while policy
is applied. Policy starts at time t=0, is applied continuously, and ends at t=TÎ[0,tst].
The proof proceeds in three steps. Lemma 1 first proves that for any duration of policy
within TÎ[0,tst], all equilibrium paths converge to either n=0 or n=1. Lemma 2 shows that for




C i H ( )i=1
¥ { }. Given the lemmata,
we then obtain the necessary and sufficient durations of policy for each path in  ˜  N  to be an
equilibrium.
LEMMA 1.  All equilibrium paths converge to either n=0 or n=1.
In our system, this is equivalent to the non-existence of closed orbits. Suppose that there
exist a closed orbit, n × ( ). Then, there exist t1, t2 and t3 such that:
t3>t2>t1>T,
n t1 ( ) = n t3 ( ) < n t2 ( ), and
V t1,n × ( ),p
* ( ) = V t2,n × ( ), p
* ( ) = V t3,n × ( ),p
* ( ) = 0.





ò  =  e




ò  = 0. But since   is strictly





ò  = 0 implies that  e




ò  > 0, and we have a
contradiction.




C i H ( )i=1
¥ { }.
(a) If an equilibrium is not n
L
, then  ˙  n = 1- n ( ) > 0 at t=0.
(If take-off path is an equilibrium, then take-off is at t=0.)22
Consider a trajectory that leaves n=0. Let n
t0
 represent a path that stays at n=0 until t=t0³0 and
then starts to follow the given trajectory. If an equilibrium is not n
L
, then the path leaves n=0 at
some t0³0, and V t0,n
t0 × (),p × () ( )³0. Since our policy is such that  £0 during [0,t0], we have
V 0,n
0 × (),p× () ( )³V t0,n
t 0 × (),p × () ( )³0. Thus  ˙  n = 1- n ( ) > 0 at t=0.
(b)  If  ˙  n = 1- n ( ) > 0 at t=0, then  ˙  n = 1- n ( ) > 0 for tÎ[0,tst].
(If take-off is to take place at t=0, then n increases strictly during the period it takes to reach nst).
Suppose that the path turns back at t<tst. This means V t,n × (),p × () ( )=0, which implies that
V 0,n × ( ), p × ( ) ( )<0, since our policy is such that  £0 during [0,t), and thus  ˙  n = - n < 0 at t=0.
Given (a) and (b) above, if an equilibrium is not n
L
, then the equilibrium path has
˙  n = 1- n ( ) > 0 for tÎ[0,tst], which is n t ( ) =1- e
- t  as n increases from 0 to nst. From nst,









, ...}, as defined in Table 1.2.
Therefore, the superset of the set of equilibrium paths corresponding to a policy duration




C i H ( )i=1
¥ { }.




 is an equilibrium Û TÎ[0,tst]
(Ü) For any TÎ[0,tst],
n
L t ( ),p t ( ) ( ) =
0 for t Î 0,T [ ]
p




This obtains V t,n
L × ( ), p × () ( )< 0 for all t³0, and thus n
L
 is an equilibrium.
(Þ) trivial (T is always in [0,tst].)
(ii) n
H
 is an equilibrium Û TÎ[ta1,tst]
(Ü) For any TÎ[ta1,tst],
n
H t ( ), p t ( ) ( ) =
0 for t Î 0, T [ ]
p
*k n




For t>T, V t,n
H × (),p × () ( ) > V T,n
H × (),p × () ( ) ³ V ta1,n
H × (),p× () ( ) ³ V ta1,n
H × (),p
* ( ) ³ 0.
For tÎ[0,T], V t,n
H × (),p × () ( ) =  e
-r -t ( ) n
H( ), p( ) ( )d
t
T
ò  +  e
-r -t ( ) n











ò    ³   0.
Therefore V t,n
H × (),p × () ( )³0 for all t³0, and n
H
 is an equilibrium.
(Þ) Suppose TÎ[0,ta1). Then,
V 0,n
H × ( ), p × () ( )
 =  e
-r n
H( ), p( ) ( )d
0
T
ò  +  e
-r n
H( ), p( ) ( )d
T
ta1
ò  +  e
-r n























ò  + 0   <   0,
which means that n
H
 is not an equilibrium.
(iii) n
C 1L
 is an equilibrium Û TÎ[ta2,tst]
(Ü) For any TÎ[ta2,tst],
n
C1L t ( ), p t ( ) ( ) =
0 for t Î 0,T [ ]
p
*k n






C1L × ( ), p × () ( ) = V t,n
C1L × (),p
* ( ) < V tb1,n
C1L × ( ), p
* ( ) = 0.
For tÎ(T,tb1],
 V t,n
C1L × ( ), p × () ( ) =  e





ò  +  e


























ò  + 0   >   0.
For tÎ[0,T],
V t,n
C1L × ( ), p × () ( ) =  e
-r -t ( ) n
C1L( ), p( ) ( )d
t
T
ò  +  e






 +  e













ò  + 0   ³   0.
Therefore n
C1L
 is an equilibrium.
(Þ) Suppose TÎ[0,ta2). Then,24
V 0,n
C1L × (),p × () ( )
 =  e
-r n
C1L( ),p( ) ( )d
0
T



















ò  + 0   <   0,
which means that n
C1L
 is not an equilibrium.
Recursively, it can be shown that:
n
C1H
 is an equilibrium Û TÎ[ta3,tst],
n
C2L
 is an equilibrium Û TÎ[ta4,tst],
n
C2H
 is an equilibrium Û TÎ[ta5,tst], ...








































T=tst « ˜  N 
C. Proofs of Propositions
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2
These follow from the correspondence established in Appendix B.
Proposition 1.3
ta1 depends positively on na1, and the definition of na1 in Appendix A shows that na1 depends
positively on r and negatively on  .25
Proposition 2.1
This follows from the correspondence established in Appendix B.
Proposition 2.2
Since nb1>nst, we have  nb1, p
* ( )> nst,p
* ( )=0.
Proposition 2.3




This follows from the correspondence established in Appendix B.




L t ( ), p t ( ) ( ) =
0 for t Î 0,T [ ]
p




This implies that V t,n
L × ( ), p × () ( )<0 for all t³0, and therefore, n
L
 is an equilibrium.




H t ( ), p t ( ) ( ) = ³ 0 for t Î 0,T [ ]
p
*k n






H × (),p × () ( ) =  e
-r -t ( ) n
H( ),p( ) ( )d
t
t a1
ò  +  e
-r -t ( ) n





-r -t ( ) p
*k n
H t ( ) ( ) -1 ( )d
t
ta1
ò  + 0    <    0.
Therefore, n
H
 is not an equilibrium.




C1L t ( ), p t ( ) ( ) =
max , p
*k n
C1L t ( ) ( )-1 { } for t Î 0,T [ ]
p
*k n




For tÎ(tb1,¥), V t,n
C1L × ( ), p × () ( )<0.
For tÎ[T,tb1], since t³ta2,
V t,n
C1L × ( ), p × () ( ) =  e
-r -t ( ) n
C1L( ), p( ) ( )d
t
t a1
ò  +  e
-r -t ( ) n





-r -t ( ) n
C1L( ), p( ) ( )d
t
t a1
ò  + 0    ³    0.
For tÎ[0,T), since T³ta2,26
V t,n
C1L × ( ), p × () ( ) =  e
-r -t ( ) n




 +  e
-r -t ( ) n
C 1L( ), p( ) ( )d
T
ta1
ò  +  e
-r -t ( ) n





-r -t ( ) max ,p
*k n




 +  e
-r -t ( ) n
C 1L( ), p( ) ( )d
T
ta1
ò  + 0    >    0.
Therefore, n
C1L
 is an equilibrium.
Proposition 7.  This follows from Propositions 5, 6, and Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3: If ta1£T<ta2, then for any  ³0, either n
L
 or a one cycle U-turn path to stagnation
which is distinct from n
C1L
 is an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i)  If V 0,n
L × (),p × () ( )<0, then V t,n
L × ( ), p × () ( )<0 for all t³0, and n
L
 is an equilibrium.
(ii)  If V 0,n
L × (),p × () ( )³0, then n
L
 is not an equilibrium, and there exists nUÎ[0,nT) such that
the path n
U
 defined by  ˙  n = (1-n) as n increases from 0 to nU and  ˙  n =- n as n decreases from
nU to 0 is an equilibrium.
Proposition 8.  (i)  If policy is such that V tb1,n
L × (),p × () ( )³ 0, then T>tb1>ta1 and  >0. Then,
V t,n
H × (),p × () ( )>0 for all t³0, and n
H
 is an equilibrium.
(ii)  If V tb1,n
L × (),p × () ( )³ 0, then n
L
 is not an equilibrium.
(iii)  There does not exist tU such that V tU,n × ( ), p × () ( )=0.
Take a tU£tb1. Let n
U
 be the path with  ˙  n = (1-n) during [0, tU] and  ˙  n =- n during (tU,¥).
Then, V tU,n
U × (),p× () ( ) > V tU,n
L × ( ), p × () ( ) ³ V tb1,n
L × (),p × () ( ) ³ 0.
Take a tU>tb1. Then, V tU,n
U × (),p× () ( ) > V tb1,n
C1L × (),p × () ( ) > V tb1,n
L × (),p × () ( ) ³ 0.
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Economics, 106, 963-974.FIGURE 1: Global Dynamics
V=0






TABLE 1.1: Path Descriptions (initial state: n=0)
path description how n changes
n
L t ( ) stagnation at S0 0
n
H t ( ) monotonic growth to S1 0 +
¾  ®  ¾  1
n
C1L t ( ) 1-cycle path to S0 0 +
¾  ®  ¾  nb1
-
¾  ®  ¾  0
n
C1H t ( ) 1-cycle path to S1 0 +
¾  ®  ¾   nb2
-
¾  ®  ¾   na1
+
¾  ®  ¾  1
n
C2L t ( ) 2-cycle path to S0 0 +
¾  ®  ¾   nb3
-
¾  ®  ¾   na2
+
¾  ®  ¾   nb1
-
¾  ®  ¾  0
n
CiL t ( ) i-cycle path to S0
n
CiH t ( ) i-cycle path to S1
note: +
¾  ®  ¾   indicates the period during which  ˙  n = + (1-n)
-
¾  ®  ¾   indicates the period during which  ˙  n = - nTABLE 1.2: Explicit Forms of Paths
explicit form
n
L t ( ) = 0
n
H t ( ) = 1-e
- t
n
C1L t ( ) =
1- e
- t for  t Î 0,tb1 [ ]
nb1
1-nb1 e





C1H t ( )=
1- e
- t for  t Î 0,tb2 [ ]
nb2
1-nb2 e
- t for  t Î tb2 ,
1 ln
nb2
na1 1-nb2 ( ) ( )
1-
1-na1 ( )nb2
na1 1-nb 2 ( ) e
- t for  t Î 1 ln
nb 2
na1 1-nb2 ( ) ,¥ [ )
ì 
í  ï 
î  ï 
n
C2L t ( ) =
1- e
- t for  t Î 0, t b 3 [ ]
n b 3
1 -n b 3 e
- t for  t Î tb3,
1 ln
nb3
na2 1-nb3 ( ) ( )
1-
1-na2 ( )nb3
na2 1-nb 3 ( ) e
- t for  t Î
1 ln
nb3
na2 1-nb3 ( ),
1 ln
1-na2 ( )nb3
1-nb1 ( )na2 1-nb3 ( ) [ ]
nb1 1-na2 ( )nb3
1-nb1 ( )na2 1-nb3 ( ) e
- t for  t Î
1 ln
1-na2 ( )nb3
1-nb1 ( )na2 1-nb3 ( ),¥ ( )
ì 
í 
ï  ï 
î 
ï  ï 
FIGURE 2: Duration of Protection (ta1£T<ta2 case illustrated)






TABLE 2: Correspondence Between Duration of Protection and Equilibria
note: Tables 1.1 and 1.2 define and describe the paths














































FIGURE 4: How Path n

































FIGURE 6: How Path n
C1L

















tFIGURE 7: How Path n
C1H





















na1 1-nb 2 ( )